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Chapter VIII : Policy incentives and disincentives for inclusion 
of material in the MLS
Devendra Gauchan, Krishna Prasad Pant, Bal Krishna Joshi, Pashupati Chaudhary and Chiranjibi Bhattarai
Incentives have long been used by governments to manipulate macro and sectoral economies. 
The aim of establishing both economic and non-economic incentives for biodiversity 
conservation is to influence people’s desire and behaviour to conserve — rather than degrade 
or deplete — biodiversity in the course of their economic activities. Incentives modify the 
structure and effects of household utility function and give people the opportunity to choose 
the best option for them. 
Scientists and practitioners began to promote biodiversity conservation after the historic 
summit that produced the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) in 1992. Article 11 of the 
CBD stipulates that “Each Contracting Party shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, adopt 
economically and socially sound measures that act as incentives for the conservation and 
Key messages
•	 Relevant policies and legal and institutional frameworks provide limited incentives for the conservation, 
exchange, value addition, and wider use of agricultural plant genetic resources (PGRs). 
•	 Biopiracy of PGRs, traditional knowledge, and the perceived absence of mechanisms for benefit sharing are 
disincentives for researchers, farmers, and private-sector organizations to share PGRs under the Multilateral 
System (MLS).
•	 The main incentives for sharing PGRs are secure ownership rights and recognition that the shared material is 
used for national and global food security.
•	 Most of the breeders, researchers, farmers, and policymakers we surveyed are not aware of ITPGRFA and MLS 
provisions concerning incentives and disincentives for providing their materials under the MLS.
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sustainable use of components of biological diversity” (United Nations 1992). The multilateral 
system (MLS) of the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 
(ITPGRFA) can be implemented only if national governments, international organizations, 
and individual users of plant genetic resources (PGRs) for food and agriculture worldwide 
embrace its collaborative spirit and approach to PGR conservation and use as an international 
effort (Lopez-Noriega et al. 2012). Article 11.2 of the ITPGRFA states that parties agree to 
invite and encourage holders of the 35 crops and 29 forage species listed in Annex I to include 
them in the MLS to facilitate their exchange (FAO 2004).
According to the ITPGRFA, the PGRs of the 64 species listed in Annex I that are “under the 
management and control” of the national government and “in the public domain” are automatically 
included in the MLS (Halewood et al. 2013). However, for PGRs that fall outside these criteria, 
ITPGRFA member states agree to encourage “natural and legal persons” (companies, individuals, 
groups with legally recognized collective identities) to voluntarily include them in the MLS. 
In reality, it is unlikely that people will share their PGRs and associated knowledge until they 
see some form of monetary or non-monetary incentives or direct or indirect benefits. Thus, 
it is important to understand what incentives are in place and the perceptions of various 
stakeholders about these incentives and whether they may be motivated to participate in the 
MLS and voluntarily include PGRs in the MLS. Such information is scanty in Nepal.
It is generally believed that, in rural areas, biological and genetic resources flow between 
villages according to social custom and through social connections or networks (Subedi et al. 
2003) with the help of social capital (Pretty and Smith 2004). In a study to test this hypothesis, 
Pant (2007) found that 25% of farmers had sent biological and genetic resources to other areas 
or villages in 2006. 
However, policies and incentives that affect the flow, use, and exchange of PGRs under the 
MLS have not received the same level of attention from national and international decision-
makers, despite the fact that those policies affect agricultural and economic development. 
Thus, we undertook to analyze current incentives and disincentives; identify key policy 
options to create incentives so that disincentives and factors hindering voluntary inclusion in 
MLS are eliminated; and provide useful insights and suggest mechanisms and strategies to 
encourage voluntary inclusion of PGRs in the MLS.
The concept of incentives and disincentives
Incentives and policies influence the exchange, flow, use, and inclusion of PGRs voluntarily 
at the international, national, and local levels. International policies, agreements, and legal 
frameworks guide the development and enforcement of policies and laws at the national level. 
National policies and laws have a direct impact through related product and input markets, 
prices, information, and regulations. Regulations under national laws can facilitate or impose 
restrictions on the access, use, and exchange of PGRs in communities, regions, and beyond 
national boundaries. National policies (property rights, trade, investment, fiscal, monetary, 
etc.), as well as sectoral policies (on the environment, forestry, agriculture, commerce, and 
education), also create incentives and disincentives for the inclusion and use of PGRs (Gauchan 
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et al. 2003, 2005). Similarly, local informal institutions, such as traditional rules, norms, and 
common and customary practices, may also create incentives or disincentives.
Incentives for inclusion of PGRs in the MLS are mainly of three types: direct, indirect, and 
perverse incentives (Figure 8.1). Direct incentives include cash and in-kind inducements 
provided by the state, whereas indirect incentives are sociocultural, market, fiscal, and 
administrative factors influencing farmers’ and stakeholders’ choices. Perverse incentives are 
subsidies and compensation for cultivation and commercialization of high-yielding modern 
seed varieties that negatively affect the conservation, use, and inclusion of indigenous PGRs 
in the MLS. In this study, we focus mainly on direct and indirect incentives. 
Figure 8.1. Types of incentives for including genetic resources in the multilateral system.
Methods
In this study, we carried out a literature review and held consultation meetings and field 
surveys of selected key stakeholders of PGRs.  First, relevant international and national 
policy and legal documents that create incentives and disincentives were reviewed to study 
how such mechanism influence the flow, exchange, use, and voluntarily inclusion of PGRs 
in the MLS. 
An exploratory survey was carried out with key representatives of plant breeders and 
researchers in the Agricultural Botany Division of the Nepal Agricultural Research Council 
(NARC); the National Rice Research Program (NRRP), Hardinath, Dhanusha; the National 
Wheat Research Program (NWRP), Bhairahawa; and the National Maize Research Program 
(NMRP), Rampur Chitwan. In addition, seed specialists and planners from the Seed Quality 
Control Centre, the Ministry of Agricultural Development, and the Seed Science and 
Technology Division of NARC were consulted. 
At the community and farm level, community seed bank (CSB) managers; community-based 
seed producer groups; users of seeds, mainly farmers at Kachorwa, Bara, and Dalchowki, 
Lalitpur; and representatives of CSB leaders from Dhading and Sindhuplanchowk were 
interviewed to gather their perceptions on incentives and disincentives and factors that 
Incentives
Direct Indirect Perverse
Subsidies 
CompensationCash (royalties, 
revenues)
Sociocultural Market & 
Fiscal Administrative
In-kind (germplasm, 
variety equipment, 
chemical)
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promote or hinder the voluntary inclusion of material in the MLS. The survey of farmers 
and CSB managers aimed to understand and document local practices, norms, and customs 
influencing germplasm flow and inclusions. Complementary collection of information was 
carried out with selected plant breeders and researchers, using focused checklists based on 
the prioritized list of PGRs. 
Information on incentives and disincentives was analyzed, synthesized, and documented. 
Stakeholder consultations at the national level in Kathmandu and at the regional level (e.g., 
NMRP, Rampur) were used to obtain input and feedback on the survey findings, which were 
then incorporated into the draft report.
Incentives and disincentives for sharing PGRs under the MLS
Several ITPGRFA member countries are still in the process of making decisions regarding the 
allocation of their PGRs under the MLS. According to Vernooy et al. (2013), to date, there is 
little information in members’ reports to the ITPGRFA governing body about material that 
has been voluntarily included in the MLS; only six countries, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
Peru, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, have provided such details. There is also little 
information about the measures that member states are taking to encourage such inclusion 
(Table 8.1).
Table 8.1. Incentives and disincentives for countries to include plant genetic resources (PGRs) in 
the multilateral system (MLS)
Incentives Disincentives
•	 Displays altruism by helping the global community 
ensure food security
•	 Increases the possibility of benefiting from 
technology transfer associated with the PGRs
•	 Helps conserve genetic resources by creating a global 
backup
•	 Enhances the reputation of countries that contribute 
significantly to the MLS
•	 Increases moral pressure on other member countries 
to increase their contribution
•	 Creates satisfaction from contributing to the work of 
fellow breeders all over the world and allowing them 
to breed better varieties
•	 Loss of national control over genetic resources
•	 Resources become pubic and can be used even by 
non-contributors and small contributors
•	 Liability attached to providing related information
•	 Putting superior genetic resources into the MLS may 
hurt export interests of the contributing country
•	 Erodes negotiating power of the country in future 
exchanges of PGRs that are not put under the MLS by 
other countries
•	 Feeling of let others go first in sharing PGRs
•	 Poor understanding of the importance of the MLS 
in increasing food production for the growing world 
population
•	 Countries with superior PGRs gain less from sharing 
with those with fewer and lower-quality PGRs
The real custodians of PGRs for food and agriculture are the farming communities. Some 
such communities have formed CSBs to protect genetic resource that are under threat from 
agricultural modernization. Farming communities and their committees governing CSBs may 
have several incentives and disincentives for sharing their PGRs under the MLS (Table 8.2). 
See also chapter 6.
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Table 8.2. Incentives and disincentives for community seed banks to include plant genetic resources 
(PGRs) in the multilateral system (MLS)
Incentives Disincentives
•	 Altruistic feeling from helping farmers in other parts 
of the world
•	 Chance to obtain advanced materials or developed 
and released seeds for ready use
•	 Opportunity to receive technology related to varieties
•	 Feeling of comfort knowing their resources are safe 
and can be retrieved in time of need
•	 Recognition as a donor of PGRs to the MLS
•	 Opportunities to receive materials from the MLS 
in exchange for their contribution, thus increasing 
options for future breeding 
•	 Material (quality seeds) and non-material (subsidies) 
benefits through working with the national authority 
for MLS implementation
•	 Fear that their PGRs will be exploited by others for 
commercial purposes
•	 Failure to understand the importance of the MLS
•	 Fear that sharing materials in the MLS may require 
surrendering their traditional knowledge about the 
resources
•	 Sharing superior genetic resources can increase 
competition in the market and reduce the price of 
their products
•	 Sharing superior PGRs can decrease their value
•	 Temptation to share low-quality local landraces and 
retain superior materials for their own future use 
•	 Reliance on the global gene pool may reduce 
motivation to invest financial and human resources in 
conservation of PGRs
•	 Fear of losing their uniqueness (e.g., unique variety)
Incentives and disincentives in key policies
Currently, there are no clear, well-defined policies or regulations that provide incentives for 
the voluntary inclusion of materials in the MLS in Nepal.  However, some key existing policies 
have directly or indirectly created incentives or disincentives for the exchange of PGRs. Some 
of these are highlighted below.
Seed policy
The current seed policy and legislation provide incentives for putting improved crop varieties 
and released and registered landraces that are already in public domain into the MLS. 
Once a landrace is released or registered, it is considered a public good; it comes under the 
management and control of the national government and its genetic materials are freely sold 
and exchanged without restriction. However, registration of a few landraces has only recently 
been initiated with the National Seed Board despite the increasing trend to register hybrid 
varieties by the private sector. 
In the last 4 years, the registration of hybrids has increased significantly following a favourable 
shift in policy (2008 amendment of the Seed Act 1988) (MoAD 2008). So far, 245 exotic hybrid 
vegetables and 17 rice and 35 maize hybrids have been registered (MoAD 2013). This trend in 
registration of hybrids is a result of incentives available to the private sector, which perceives 
great benefits from the hybrid seed business. In addition, plant breeders and other scientists 
in the public sector receive better recognition (officially or from their peers), rewards, 
international links, and academic career advancement if their improved varieties and hybrids 
are tested, released, and registered. 
In contrast, farmers and other plant breeders do not have clear incentives to register and release 
local landraces. Even though legislation has made it easier to register landraces, stakeholders 
see no commercial benefit from doing so because of their low yields, lack of uniformity, and 
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low market demand except for few high-quality varieties, such as Basmati rice. Hence, there 
are limited incentives for farmers, community seed bank groups, and private companies 
to put their landraces and traditional PGRs into MLS through the registration and release 
process. Moreover, the current Seed Act has the provision for stakeholders to obtain breeders’ 
or ownership rights for improved varieties. Therefore, as a rule, unless ownership rights and 
recognition are given, individuals have no incentive to share PGRs voluntarily in the MLS.
Plant variety protection and farmers’ rights
The draft Plant Variety Protection and Farmers’ Rights Bill (MoAD 2005) does not recognize 
or include provisions for Annex I crop species. It awards ownership rights to farmers for their 
local varieties as well as new plant varieties (farmers can claim intellectual property rights 
and act as breeders); hence, if anyone wants to access and share PGRs, prior informed consent 
must be obtained. However, breeders’ rights to new varieties are not applicable for private, 
non-commercial uses, study, academic and research purposes, and breeding and development 
of new varieties. Hence, the breeders’ exemption clause could be used to motivate breeders 
to voluntary include PGRs in the MLS. Individuals and institutions also have the right to 
transfer or sell such rights for a specified period. 
Agro-biodiversity Policy 2007
The original Agro-biodiversity Policy (2007) had no provision for sharing genetic resources 
voluntarily in the MLS, as it had not been harmonized or formulated in the context of the 
ITPGRFA. However, it has recently been revised and provisions for the MLS included. The 
policy now includes:
 y Provisions for facilitating two-way access and sharing of PGRs as per provisions of 
the ITPGRFA.
 y Provision of a designated authority to facilitate inclusion in the  MLS (discussions 
are underway among stakeholders).
 y Strengthening the national genebank and provision of links with CSBs to facilitate 
access to and exchange of PGRs.
 y Provision for prior informed consent in the form of a Standard Material Transfer 
Agreement (SMTA) from farmers and communities holding PGRs required by 
international institutions (provides room for negotiating incentives or benefits).
However, the revised Agro-biodiversity Policy makes no explicit mention of provisions and 
mechanisms for encouraging individuals to put their PGRs into the MLS as envisaged by 
ITPGFRA Article 11.2 (FAO 2004).
Perceptions of community seed bank managers and farmers
Although there are about 115 CSBs in Nepal, few of them are strictly conservation oriented 
(Joshi 2013). A survey of conservation-focused CSB managers and farmers revealed that they 
are not very aware of ITPGRFA and MLS provisions, including incentives and disincentives 
to put their material into the MLS.
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Views of knowledgeable CSB managers and members
CSB managers who are more aware of the importance of local genetic resources feel that the 
landraces and other farmers’ varieties that are being conserved and used in the local community 
should not be shared with national and international organizations without their prior consent. 
Ownership and recognition of their genetic materials should be provided if they are shared with 
other organizations and outside the country. For sharing with the national gene bank, managers 
need some form of evidence that their material is stored, such as a certificate of deposit, and a 
guarantee that the material can only be shared with prior consent and due recognition. 
However, increased awareness of the creation and exchange of genetic resources among 
the national gene bank, international agricultural research centres, and communities might 
increase confidence and encourage communities to share their local genetic resources under 
the MLS. This may be possible only after developing trust and collaborative relations with 
R&D programs, as evident from the current field studies conducted in local CSBs in Kachorwa, 
Bara, and Dalchowki, Lalitpur. A national workshop held in 2013, in which CSB members 
discussed various management and policy-related issues, including the sharing of PGRs, also 
revealed that farmers seem willing to share their materials provided they also receive a fair 
share of benefits and their roles are properly recognized.
Views of general farmers outside the CSB system
Many subsistence farmers outside the CSB areas and on-farm conservation project areas did 
not object to their seed materials being freely shared with outsiders in small amounts. Many 
of these farmers have been exchanging and sharing small quantities of seeds over generations, 
whenever outsiders request them. Indeed, they feel honoured to be able to exchange their 
local seed materials and other genetic resources with outsiders. This practice occurs in many 
remote rural areas where farmers lack awareness, knowledge, and information about their 
rights to genetic resources. As a result, biopiracy is increasing.
Biopiracy is the use or appropriation of genetic resources without the necessary access 
permits or fulfilling agreed conditions and is, therefore, illicit (Biber-Klemm and Martinez 
2006). Biopiracy has also been defined as the use of intellectual property laws (patents, 
plant breeders’ rights) to gain exclusive ownership and control of biological resources and 
knowledge, without recognition, reward, or protection to informal innovators (RAFI 1996).
Farmers face a tradeoff between compromising food production by restricting the flow of 
genetic resources and risking biopiracy by allowing freer movement (Pant 2007). Adequate 
legal provisions and implementation mechanisms are required to increase the flow and use of 
genetic resources and reduce the chances of their misappropriation for commercial purposes.
Perceptions of plant breeders and researchers
Many of the plant breeders and researchers we consulted had little knowledge and awareness 
of the ITPGRFA and the provisions of the MLS. They have some knowledge of intellectual 
property rights and SMTA, but not of the specific provisions of facilitated access under the 
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MLS and ITPGRFA. Plant breeders and researchers are willing to share their own released 
and registered varieties voluntarily in the MLS. However, they are not willing to share the 
materials they are in the process of breeding and developing. 
Breeders and researchers are very cautious about sharing pre-breeding materials and 
landraces, especially with private seed companies and especially multinational ones. In 
sharing material under development, they want to secure ownership rights and recognition 
of their work. International links, exposure visits, and increased capacity building among 
young researchers provide some incentives for sharing and exchange of genetic resources 
for the global benefit. Many plant breeders and researchers feel that some form of royalties is 
needed to encourage them to develop, exchange, and share their genetic resources with other 
researchers within the country and around the globe.
Increased biopiracy of genetic resources and traditional knowledge and the possible lack of 
fair and equitable benefit-sharing due to inadequate information and lack of well-documented 
traits-related information on PGRs are perceived as disincentives for researchers and plant 
breeders to share PGRs under the MLS. In some cases, lack of financial and human resources 
and poorly coordinated institutional mechanisms have also been disincentives for plant 
breeders to deposit material with the MLS. 
Assured access to important germplasm from the MLS and to the international system is a 
motivation for breeders in both public and private sectors to share their genetic resources, 
expertise, skills, and time. They see this leading to greater opportunities to develop varieties that 
are adapted to various production environments, including adverse environments. As many plant 
breeders and researchers have poor knowledge and awareness of ITPGRFA and MLS provisions 
and the importance of facilitated access and exchange to national and global food security, more 
information on the MLS and its benefits may provide incentives to breeders and communities.
Conclusions
Providing evidence of ownership of PGRs and recognition in the form of acknowledgement 
and certificates of deposition of shared material, as well as some form of benefit (e.g., exchange 
of materials) are important incentives for stakeholders to share materials through the MLS. 
Lack of awareness of the importance of the MLS in maintaining national food security is the greatest 
disincentive to individuals voluntarily sharing PGRs through the MLS. Improved understanding 
and awareness of the role of MLS in national and global food security among policymakers, plant 
breeders, research and development professionals, farmers, and local communities is, therefore, 
essential to initiate and accelerate the process of voluntary inclusion of PGRs.
Under the ITPGRFA, member states agree to encourage “natural and legal persons” (companies, 
individuals, groups with legally recognized collective identities) to voluntarily include PGRs of 
the 64 crops and forage species listed in Annex I in the MLS. In this context, the Government of 
Nepal can consider mechanisms to encourage this practice, for example by requiring recipients 
of public funding for research to make their PGRs available through the MLS. 
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Equally important is the need to consider the means by which materials can be voluntarily 
included and made available. For example, the national genebank could accept deposits of 
PGRs that a CSB, company, or individual wishes to make voluntarily and, subsequently, make 
them available under the SMTA. Alternatively, those companies, individuals, and communities 
could be allowed to provide the materials directly using the SMTA, by developing special 
mechanisms and incentives to encourage and allow voluntary inclusion of PGRs in the MLS. 
This will require the development and implementation of adequate incentives and benefits 
through policy, legislation, and programs. 
The following key policies and incentives might encourage communities and countries to 
participate in the MLS.
 y Recognize donors and provide evidence of the deposition of PGRs in the MLS, even 
those that are not commercialized. Pedigree records and other documents can help 
trace the initial contributors. 
 y Ensure clear mechanisms for sharing benefits from the commercial use of PGRs 
provided by any country or community. Technological advancements, such as 
DNA fingerprinting, are necessary to trace the flow of genetic resources put into the 
MLS to ensure that they are not used for commercial purposes without sharing the 
benefits.
 y Ensure providers of PGRs that the resources they share through the MLS will not 
be misused, and develop and revise legislation to protect the rights of the donor 
against misuse of their resources. The MLS should ensure that PGRs in the MLS will 
be used only for food security and not for trade interests.
 y Develop a reporting system so that donors of PGRs are regularly informed and 
updated about the use and further development of the PGRs they provide. 
 y Educate custodians of the resources that their work contributes to food security of 
people all over the world.
 y Develop national legislation that provides custodian farmers and other owners and 
donors with rights over their PGRs so that they have authority to provide PGRs to 
the MLS and negotiate benefit-sharing.
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